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AGENCY LAW
BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES LITIGATION: TENTH CIRCUIT
APPROACHES TO STANDING AND AGENCY DISCRETION
INTRODUCTION

Environmental and natural resource plaintiffs that sue federal agencies must overcome two barriers that might prevent a federal court from
addressing the merits of their arguments. One is the standing requirement, which assures that a proper plaintiff is before the court.1 The other
is agency discretion.2 Plaintiffs that sue federal agencies must survive a
court's tests regarding whether they should defer to the agency's decisions regarding the merits.3 If the court decides the agency's approach is
in accordance with the law, the environmental plaintiff likely has prepared its case in vain. Plaintiffs face a double-edged sword. They must
meet standing requirements to withstand one slice of the sword: a chance
for the court to dismiss the case. Plaintiffs then must withstand the second swing: a court's attempt to defer to agency discretion, which could
effectively take the controversy away from the court.
These issues are especially important in the U.S. Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Due to its jurisdiction over six central and western
states-including tens of thousands of acres of federal land and a number
of important national parks, it hears many cases involving plaintiffs suing federal agencies over public lands, natural resources, and other environmental issues.4
The Tenth Circuit has decided over four hundred cases dealing with
standing or agency discretion.5 Usually, they involved local resource
1. Plater, et. al. Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and Society, 398 (2nd ed.
1998).
2.
Id. at 430. ("Deference to agencies' legal interpretations is most likely where a legislative
scheme seems highly technical, with a wide range of details delegated to the agency's special
expertise.").
3.
Id.
4.
The Tenth Circuit includes Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and
Wyoming. Yellowstone, Grand Tetons, Rocky Mountain, Zion and Canyonlands National Parks, as
well as many national monuments, fall within the jurisdiction.
5.
Author's count. Approximately thirty cases were decided at least in part on standing or
agency discretion grounds during the survey period of September 1, 1999 to August 31, 2000. See,
e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (Pg. 12, this paper for more
detail.)(Nonprofit organization, guide, and rock climbers challenged the National Park Service's
approval of Final Climbing Management Plan for Devils Tower National Monument in Wyoming.
The plaintiffs argued that climbing restrictions designed to reduce harm to Native American spiritual
practices violated the establishment clause of the Constitution. The court held that plaintiffs suffered
no injury in fact so lacked standing.); See also, Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102
193
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users and environmental organizations suing federal agencies over
6
agency decisions about popular local issues. An understanding of the
way the court assessed some of these issues might encourage environmental plaintiffs to reevaluate their cases to make sure they can effectively meet standing requirements and resist deference to agency decision-making in the Tenth Circuit.
Three cases concerning high-profile environmental issues exemplify
these points. One case addresses standing and two cases address agency
discretion. 8 First, a fairly typical standing case, Bishchoff v. Meyers,9 is
reviewed. It involves federal-land grazing permits. 10 The Tenth Circuit
ruled that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring suit." This case also
serves as an introduction to the next cases. The second case, Wyoming
Farm Bureau Fed. v. Babbitt,12 concerns a high-visibility endangered
species topic: a US Department of Interior decision concerning the fate
of endangered wolf reintroduction in Wyoming and Idaho, 13 an issue that
has drawn expansive media attention and has inspired challenges by environmentalists, ranchers and other private land owners alike. 14 The
plaintiffs argued that the U.S. Department of Interior abused its discretion by creating a wolf-release plan in conflict with what they considered
guiding principles of the Endangered Species Act. 15 The court
disagreed. 16 The last case, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Dabney,17 concerns the National Park Service's Backcountry Manage-

F.3d 445 (Environmental organization brought a NEPA action against Forest Service's challenging
its decision to allow summer use of a ski area in national forest. The Tenth Circuit held that the
organization had standing.); See also, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287 (discretion of
agency regarding livestock grazing permits); Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167
(unlawful use of agency discretion).
6. Id.
Bischoff v. Myers, 216 F.3d 1086 (Table) (10th Cir. 2000), Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed. v.
7.
F.3d
Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000), Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, (10th Cir. 2000).
Bischoffis a standing case. Babbitt and Dabney involve agency discretion.
8.
9. Bischoff, 216 F.3d 1086.
10. Id.
11.
Id.
12. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224.
13. Id.
14. See National Public Radio, Wolves in Yellowstone, http://search.npr.org/cf
/cmn/cmnps05fm.cfm?SeglD=-69171; see also, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC
PARK PROFILES: YELLOWSTONE COUNTRY, 12, 44, 98-99, 182 (1997); for possible reintroductions
in Colorado, see Theo Stein, Wolf reintroductionroams closer to Colorado, Denver Post, February
17, 2001, at Al.
15.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d. 1224; guiding principles such as an alleged requirement that introduced
wolves should not mix with wolves already present in the ecosystem (see discussion in this article
below, pp. 25-30).
16. Id.
17.
Dabney, 222 F.3d 819.
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ment Plan for Canyonlands National Park.' 8 Environmental plaintiffs
argued that the National Park Service abused its discretion by creating a
plan that would allow off-road vehicle use.' 9 This case was remanded for
clarification of the effects of such use.2°
I. STANDING
A. Background

1. Standing as defined by the US Supreme Court
A basic axiom of federal trial practice is that environmental plaintiffs
must meet the "threshold constitutional and statutory tests" of standing to
sue.2 Fundamentally, Article III, Section Two of the Constitution requires that there be a present (or live) "case" or "controversy. 2 2 Moreover, the plaintiff must show that the defendant caused his injury,23 and
that he has been injured "in fact," usually proven by demonstrated economic injury.24 Once injury in fact is established, plaintiffs also must
meet "prudential limitations" on standing, created by the Supreme Court
to allow for judicial discretion to restrict the kinds of parties that can
bring suit.25 One such limitation is that few third-party claims can be

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.
See PLATER supra note 1,at 398; standing in state court depends on state law.
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Various cases have dealt with this issue, but the first instance of
this doctrine occurred when President George Washington wanted the Supreme court's opinion on
the United States' neutrality regarding the war between England and France. The court firmly
rejected the offer, based on the Constitution's system of checks and balances requiring the Executive
Branch to make decisions. See HART AND WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS 92-93 (4th ed., 1996); see
also, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
102 (1998).
23.
See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 93 S.Ct. 114 (1972); see also, Arizonans for Official
English v.Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)("It is the
responsibility of the complaintant clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to
invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial powers."); FW/PBS,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)(Plaintiffs must "allege ... facts essential to show
jurisdiction. If [they] fail to make the necessary allegations [they have] no standing.").
24. See PLATER supranote 1,at 400-01; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-1
(1992); for a good summary, see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv. (TOC),
Inc.., 120 S.Ct. 693, 704 (2000) ("A plaintiff must show (1)it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. An association has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to
sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.").
25.
See PLATER supra note 1,at 398-99; see also Japan Whaling Assoc. v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S.Ct. 2860 (1986).
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heard.26 Another prudential limitation is that the plaintiff must fall within
27
the "zone of interest" of the statute being challenged. Also, a plaintiff
must show that his injuries will be 'cured' by a favorable court decision,
a requirement called redressability. 28 Also, many statutes authorize judicial review only if certain requirements are met. 29 For instance, the Administrative Procedure Act allows standing for "persons adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of the relevant statute" 3° and
when agency action is considered "final.'
Environmental cases provide the backbone of the Supreme Court's
efforts to refine standing requirements during the last thirty years. 32 Sierra Club v. Morton,33 a quintessential environmental standing case,
proved plaintiffs do not necessarily need economic injury to meet the
requirements of injury in fact.34 The Sierra Club hoped to enforce federal
conservation laws that allegedly would prevent the Walt Disney corporation from developing a ski resort on national forest lands in the California Sierras.3 5 Yet, the plaintiffs did not claim any individual injuries
that would satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. They claimed only a
general interest in environmental protection. 36 For example, the Sierra
Club did not assert that any of its members camped or hiked in the national forest or otherwise personally benefited from use of the resource.37
As a result, the US Supreme Court dismissed the organization's suit for
lack of standing, 38 but ruled that if it had been shown that any member of

26.
Except, for example, when an environmental organization plaintiff alleges injuries to its
members. See, e.g., PLATER supra note 1, at 398-99; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
27.
See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997); for detailed description, see this article
below; see also, Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28.
PLATER supra note 1, at 398-99; see also Bennett, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997); see also,
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000).
29.
PLATER supra note 1, at 399 ("like 'aggrieved' under §313(b) of the Federal Power Act
... or special citizen-enforcement authorizations for 'any person' who files a 60-day notice (included
in many environmental statutes ... they are far more liberal than the Art. Ill. 'injury' requirement,
and override prudential limitations.")); see also, Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 727.
30. PLATER supra note 1, at 399 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702).
31.
5 U.S.C. § 704.
32. As discussed next; A related issue is whether a claim is "ripe" for review; Abbott Lab v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)(The purpose of the ripeness requirement "is to prevent the
courts, though avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties."); Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)("A claim is not
ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all.").
33.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 729-730.
36. Id. at 731.
37. Id. at 735.
38. Id. at 741.
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the environmental group had suffered an aesthetic injury, that would
have satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.39 Such aesthetic injuries are
non-economic. They occur when a plaintiff cannot enjoy a resource
through use or appreciation of it because the resource itself has been degraded. 4° Two conditions must be met: the plaintiff used a resource and it
was devalued by the defendant's actions.4 '
U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP) 42 broadened the aesthetic injury requirement even further while
expanding opportunities for a plaintiff to meet causation requirements as
well. A group of Washington, D.C. law students sued the Interstate
Commerce Commission over decisions to assess low transport tariffs on
raw materials transported by rail.43 The plaintiffs alleged such low tariffs
discourage recycled-material use." The Supreme Court granted standing
', 5
even though the injury to the students was not "direct and perceptible.
The court described the long line of causation from the agency's rate
decision to an eventual increase in non-recycled garbage along hiking
in the Washington area, and found it met the cautrails in national parks
46
sation requirement.
Despite the liberalization of standing requirements in Sierra Club
and SCRAP, two cases decided by the Supreme court in the early 1990s,
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation47 (Lujan I) and Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife48 (Lujan II), raised the standing barrier for environmental
plaintiffs. They required that plaintiffs' injuries be real, not speculative.49
In Lujan I, the National Wildlife Federation challenged the federal government's potential parceling-out of public land for mining and
logging. 50 The Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of standing
because the two alleged injuries were not sufficiently concrete. 5' Two
members of the National Wildlife Federation claimed that they recreated
in the vicinity of the lands at issue, but the plaintiff did not live there or
actually recreated there.52 Justice Scalia wrote that these were merely

39. Sierra Club, 406 U.S. 727 at 738-740.
40. See id.
Sierra Club, 406 U.S. 727 at 738-740.
41.
42. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669 (1973).
43. Id. at 669-670.
44. Id. at 670.
45. Id. at 689.
46. Id. at 687-690.
47. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (Lujan 1), 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
48. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan 1), 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
49. Id. at 560-561.
50. Lujan 1,497 U.S. 871 (1990).
id. at 899-900.
51.
52. Id. at 871-872.
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generalized grievances-plaintiffs were angry about something that did
not directly affect them-and not injuries in fact.53
In Lujan H,54 Defenders of Wildlife challenged a Reagan Administration regulation under which that the Endangered Species Act only
applies to government agency projects in the United States, not around
the world. The plaintiff offered affidavits of two of its members.56 One
had visited Egypt and fell in love with the endangered Nile crocodile,
though she did not witness the animal.57 The other visited Sri Lanka and
similarly came back to the United States with great affection for endangered leopard and elephant species, though she had not personally witnessed them. 58 Both were afraid that an Egyptian water-development
project connected with the Aswan High Dam would destroy the creatures' habitats, and consequently the animals.5 9 Defenders of Wildlife
argued that the dam was to be completed in part with U.S. government
(USAID)
money, thereby
forcing
Endangered
Species
Act
consideration. 60 The organization claimed its two members would like to
go back to see the crocodiles again, but did not know when. 61 Justice
Scalia wrote that standing did not exist because the injury alleged was
not actual or imminent in the near, concrete future, despite the fact that
the plaintiffs
sued under the Endangered Species Act's citizen-suit provi62
sion:
It is clear that a person who observes or works with a particular animal threatened by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm, since
the very subject of his interest will no longer exist. It is even plausible-though it goes to the outermost limits of plausibility-to think

53.
54.

Id. at 886.

Lujan 11, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, n.3 (1992) (Seventeen days after Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Lujan II, he
made a comment in footnote three that clarified a determining factor in Lujan I. That is, specific
facts must be shown by sworn testimony at the summary judgment stage of trial. He wrote that
"Lujan II involved the establishment of injury-in-fact at the summary judgment stage, [and] required
specific facts to be added by swom testimony; had the same challenge to a generalized allegation of
injury-in-fact been made at a pleading stage, it would have been unsuccessful.").
55.
Id.; regulation applied to ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
56.
Lujan 11, 504 U.S. at 563.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 563-564.
59.
Id. at 563.
60.
Id. at 562-563; ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(All federal agencies are required "to seek
to conserve endangered species and threatened species ....
[And,] each federal agency shall, in
consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of Interior], insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of habitat of such species."
61.
Lujan H, 504 U.S. at 563-564.
62.
Id. at 566-567; ESA § 1 (g) (16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)). Perhaps if the members had
purchased airline tickets to go back, that would be enough.
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that a person who observes or works with animals of a particular species in the very area of the world where that species is threatened by a
federal decision is facing such harm, since some animals that might
have been the subject of his interest will no longer exist.... It goes
beyond that limit, however, and into pure speculation and fantasy, to
say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species,
anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion
of that species with which he has not more spe63
cific connection."

Notwithstanding his decisions in Lujan I and II, Justice Scalia effectively lowered the standing barrier (albeit for plaintiffs who were not
environmental groups) by allowing ranchers not interested in preserving
endangered species to use the Endangered Species Act's citizen-suit provision in Bennett v. Spear.64 The case involved two ranchers who feared
a loss of their water supply because river water was withheld from irrigation due to the presence of an endangered fish.65 The district court held
that the ranchers were not parties who fell within the zone of interest of
the act-they opposed species protection rather than supported it.66 Justice Scalia allowed them standing, though, holding that under the citizensuit provision 67of the act, which expands the zone of interest, any person
could file suit.
One of the most important recent environmental cases involving
standing is Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environ. Serv. 68 The
plaintiff environmental groups, Friends of the Earth, Citizens Local Environmental Action Network and the Sierra Club, sued Laidlaw under the
citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act. 69 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant did not comply with its wastewater treatment plant National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit, and discharged
mercury and other toxics exceeding permit limits into South Carolina's
North Tyger River. 70 Before the plaintiffs filed suit, the South Carolina
Deptartment. of Health and Environmental Control
settled with Laidlaw
71
over the same permit violations for $100,000.
The Supreme Court ruled that plaintiff-appellants had standing to
sue the defendant chemical company because the group's members suffered injuries that were related to recreational use of the polluted river,
63. Lujan 11, 504 U.S. 555, 566-7. (1992).
64.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (If plaintiff cannot meet Endagnered Species Act
notice requirements, it may still bring an Endangered Species Act claim under the APA or NEPA).
65. Id. at 157.
66. Id. at 155.
67. Id. at 162-164.
68.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv. (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693,
704-7 (2000).
69. Id. at 696: Clean Water Act citizen-suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
70. Friends of the Earth. 120 S.Ct. 693.696 (2000); Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §1342(a)(1).
71.
Friends of the Earth, 120 S.Ct. 693696 (2000).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

and the "aesthetic and recreational value" of the river was lessened by
defendant's mercury contamination. 72 More importantly, perhaps, the
court held that the plaintiffs had standing because civil penalties levied
on the defendant (as opposed to more traditional damages paid directly to
plaintiffs) redressed plaintiffs injuries by deterring the defendant from
polluting.73
Here is a summary of important environmental standing highlights.
If there is a present controversy and the defendant-a polluter or government agency, for example-has caused the environmental plaintiff's
injury, a plaintiff interest group whose members used a resource that was
devalued by defendant's actions has injury-in-fact standing, even if aesthetic and recreational values are lessened.74 Yet, generalized grievances
are not enough for injury in fact 75 and the injury must be actual or imminent. 76 Furthermore, plaintiffs must fall within the zone of interest of
applicable statutes.7 7 Last, fines imposed on parties devaluing the resource might meet the redressability requirement.78
2. Pre-survey Period Tenth Circuit Standing Cases
The Tenth Circuit has decided a number of environmental standing
cases in recent years. In Park Lake Resources Ltd. Liability Co. v. U.S.
Dept. of Agriculture,79 mining groups sued the U.S. Forest Service over
its designation of land as a research natural area. 80 The district court affirmed the land designation, and the plaintiff appealed. 81 The Court of
Appeals held, in part, that the agency's designation was not final agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and therefore the
suit was not ready (ripe) for review. 82
Similarly, in Colorado Farm Bureau v. U.S. Forest Service,83 trade
groups sued state and federal agencies, asserting that the agencies' in84
volvement in a Colorado Lynx reintroduction plan violated the APA.
72. Id.at 704-705 (Injuries included forgoing fishing, picknicking, bird watching, walking,
wading, boating, driving, swimming and camping in and near polluted river.).
73.
Id.at 706.
74.

Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) and Friendsof the Earth, 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000).

75. Lujan 1,497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990).
76. Lujan 11,
504 U.S.555, 563 (1992).
77. Bennett, 520 U.S. 154, 162-164 (1997).
78. Friendsof the Earth at 706-707.
79. Park Lake Resources Ltd. Liability Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 197 F.3d 448 (10th
Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 449.
81.
Id.
at 448.
82. Id.at 450-452; see 5 U.S.C.A. § 704 (An important requirement for review of agency
action is that the action be final. Only then is it ripe for review).
83. Colorado Farm Bureau Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 220 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th
Cir. 2000).
84. Id.
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The district court dismissed the case, and the groups appealed. 85 The
Court of Appeals held that the groups did not have APA standing because the agency's action-involvement with the Lynx introduction
plan-was not final. 86 Because APA standing was not established, the
87
court did not assess whether the groups had Article III standing.
In Baca v. King,88 a federal public-lands grazing-lease, case, the
Tenth Circuit put forth what it considered the minimum constitutional
standing requirements. 89 To satisfy the redressability requirement for
constitutional standing, the court wrote, the plaintiff must show at least a
'substantial likelihood' that the relief requested will redress the injury
claimed. 90 There, standing did not exist because "the loss of the possibility of obtaining a federal lease is not redressable by a favorable decision
[of the court] 1 The court continued: "No court has the power to order
the BLM [Bureau of Land Management] or the Department of Interior to
grant Mr. Baca another grazing lease, because the very determination of
whether to renew grazing permits and whether public lands should even
be designated for grazing purposes
' 92 are matters completely within the
Secretary of Interior's discretion. ,
Tenth Circuit cases have often involved injury in fact.93 For example,
a nonprofit organization, a climbing guide, and rock climbers sued the
National Park Service (NPS) over approval of its Final Cimbing Management Plan for Devils Tower National Monument in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Association v. Babbitt.94 They argued that climbing limitations
designed to reflect Native American spiritual beliefs violated the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution. 95 The Wyoming district court
allowed adoption of the plan, and the plaintiffs appealed.96 The Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiffs did not suffer injury in fact so lacked

Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173.
Baca v. King, 92 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1305 (citing Lujan 1) "[They] require ...(1)that the plaintiff "suffered an 'injury in
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical'; (2) that the injury is "'fairly ...trace [able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court' "; and (3) that it is "likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that
the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."'
90. Id. at 1306.
91.
Id. (quoting Mount Evans co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1451 (10th Cir., 1994) (citing
Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868, 870-871, 875 (10th Cir., 1992))). In both of those
cases, the court held that plaintiffs could not sue to make the court force an agency to do something.
92. Id.
93. See following discussion.
94. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
95. Id. at 815.
96. Id. at 814.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
fact'-an
Iactual or
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97
standing.9 7 In Committee
to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero,98 an environmental group challenged a U.S. Forest Service decision to allow summer
use of a National Forest ski area, alleging that the agency did not follow
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements. 9 The New
Mexico district court granted summary judgment for the ski operator
intervenor, and the plaintiffs appealed.' The Court of Appeals held that
the organization
had standing to challenge the agency's discretion under
0
NEPA.1 '

Furthermore, in Wind River Multiple Use Advocates v. Espy, 10 2 an
environmental group challenged a U.S. Forest Service decision to adopt
the Bridger-Teton National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan,
which would allow timber management unfavorable to the group. 103 The
Wyoming district court found that Wind River lacked standing because
the group did not show injury in fact or that any injury would be redressed by a decision in its favor. 0 4 As an alternative, the district court
held that the plaintiff could not win on the merits as a matter of law. 10 5
"Specifically, the district court held that Wind River had failed to create
a material fact issue with respect to whether the Forest Service decision
to adopt annual timber harvests below levels authorized by federal law
was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act,"
held the Tenth Circuit. 1°6 The plaintiff appealed the decision concerning
its lack of standing but did not challenge the ruling on the merits. Because the group did not challenge the merits ruling, the Court of Appeals
affirmed. 10 7 Finally, Ash Creek Min. Co. v. Lujan10 8 concerned a landowner's suit against the Department of Interior over the agency's plan to
exchange coal lands in the state. 1°9 The Wyoming district court dismissed
for lack of standing and the Court of Appeals held that the injury was not
redressable.'°

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
decision).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 822.
Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 446.
Id.
Id. at 452.
Wind River Multiple Use Advocates v. Epsy, 85 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 1996)(unpublished
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 870-87 1.
Id. at 872-876.
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B. Tenth Circuit: Standing
I
1. Bischoff v. Myers I

In Bischoff v. Myers, 1 2 a very brief, unpublished case, the Tenth Circuit ruled on redressabilty while highlighting agency discretion. 113 The
case involved a land transaction and grazing permit transfer. 1 4 The seller
wanted the court to review a Forest Service refusal to reissue their grazing permits to them after the buyer of their land defaulted and quitclaimed the land back to them. 15 The Forest Service determined that the
buyer remained the permittee.1 6 Forest Service rules require that when
land and livestock on it subject to grazing permits is sold, the buyer may
obtain grazing permits for the property
7 if the seller surrenders his permit
to the Service in favor of the buyer. 1
The Tenth Circuit found that the Bischoffs lacked standing to bring
the action: "The injury they allege, the loss of their grazing leases, is not
redressable in court because a court may not order the agency to perform
what is a purely discretionary act."' 18 The court wrote that its conclusion
was required by Baca v. King, 1 9 and Federal Lands Legal Consortium v.
United States,120 under which the decision to issue a grazing permit is
completely within Department of Interior discretion. 21 In doing so, the
court connected redressability, a fundamental standing requirement, to
agency discretion. 122
2. Analysis
While Bischoff was decided on redressability grounds, 123 the case is
unlike others in which redressability concerns the basic premise that a
plaintiffs injury must be cured in some legitimate way by a court deci-

111.
112.
113.

Bischoff v. Myers, 216 F.3d 1086 (Table)(10th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id.at1086.

114.

Id.

115. Id.
116. Bischoff, 216 F.3d at1086.
117.
Id.
118. Id.
lacked standing because court could not order
119. Baca, 92 F.3d at 1035-37 (plaintiff
government to renew grazing lease; no "court has the power to order the BLM or Department of
Interior to grant .. .another grazing lease, because the very determination of whether to renew
granzing permits and whether public lands should even be designated for grazing purposes are
matters completely within the Secretary of Interior's discretion."); see also, McDonald v. Clark, 771
F.2d 560, 463 (Secretary of Interior has broad discretion in mineral leasing.)
195 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999)(Secretary of Agriculture has discretion to issue or deny a
120.
grazing permit.)
121.
Id. at 1198.
122. Bischoff, 216 F.3d 1086.
123. Id.
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sion in plaintiff's favor. 24 Here, the court did not have the ability to act
in plaintiff s favor because the plaintiffs wanted something that the court
simply could not give them: reissued grazing permits.125 Only the
agency, within its expertise and discretion, could issue them.126 The court
was completely unable to provide such relief because purely discretionary agency decisions preclude the court's intervention. 127 In effect, the
Bischoffs could appeal to Forest Service decision-makers, but beyond
that, they lacked options for relief. This is an explicit example of how
standing issues are connected to discretion. More often, as mentioned
above in the double-edged sword analogy, 128 a plaintiff might meet
standing requirements such as injury in fact only to lose on appeal because the Tenth Circuit defers to the agency's discretion to make the
decision in the way it sees fit. The next two cases address this issue.
II. AGENCY DISCRETION
A. Background
Agency discretion cases arise when groups challenge the authority
under which an agency makes decisions.' Usually an agency's action or
inaction is challenged as being in conflict with the agency's mandates,
typically statutes passed by Congress. 130 Agencies typically have wideranging discretion over a variety of issues under their control,' 13 but
might abuse it by going beyond mandated boundaries. 32 Such abuse
might result in environmentally or otherwise unfavorable policies or
conditions that plaintiffs seek to-change. 133 Controversies especially arise
when agency decisions are not clearly out
of line with the intent of Con34
gress, but might go against that intent.1
B. Discretion Under Chevron and the APA
In discretion cases, courts assess whether they should defer to the
decision-making power of the agency, often relying on the 1984 Supreme Court case Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.135 There, the Court found that the Environmental Protection
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See standing discussion, supra.
Bischoff, 216 F.3d at 1086.
Id.
Id.
In the introduction to this paper, page 1.

129.
130.

See PLATER supra note 1, at 378-83.
Id.

131.
132.

Id.at 379.
Id. at 380 (Courts analyze such decisions in part by looking at Congressional intent.).

133.

See See PLATER supra note 1, at 381.

134. Id. at 378-379.
135.
Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See also, United States v.
Mead Corp. 121 S.Ct. 2164 (2001). This case may become extremely important to practitioners and
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Agency's decision to define an air pollution "source" as a "bubble" was
within the "reasonable construction" of the statutory term "source" in the
conjunctive
Clean Air Act. 36 In doing so, the Court created a two-part
37
test that provides a "reasonable construction" analysis.
The Court held, first, that if the intent of Congress is clear regarding
the statutory language designed to guide the agency, that intent rules the
agency's decision.' Second, if Congressional intent is not clear, the
court must review the agency's decision with deference, and uphold it if
it is based on a "permissible construction of the statute."'' 39 The agency's
interpretation does not have to be the only permissible construction or
the result the court would have reached.' 4° Furthermore, "when a chalon the wisdom
lenge to agency construction of a [statute] really centers
' 4' that challenge must fail.142
policy,'
agency's
of the
The Court held that federal judges who do not have a public constituency for whom they work must respect the policy choices of agencies that do have a constituency. 4 3 "[If] Congress has explicitly left a gap
for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency.
Another test used by courts reviewing agency decisions is found in
the Administrative Procedure Act. 145 The statute, a general operating law
controlling federal governmental agencies, 146 provides that the court
courts concerned with the Chevron analysis. The decision was rendered slightly before the final edit
of this paper. As of October 2001, no other decision has followed Mead's holding, so it is unlcear
how far the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling will extend. The Court held that a U.S. Customs Service
tariff classification ruling was not entitled to Chevron deference or any lesser deference. The Court
held:
Administrative implementation of a particlular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority
may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of comparable
congressional intent. The Customs ruling at issue here fials to qualify.
As this ruling stands, environmental and natural resources plaintiffs should examine all
administrative rulings that appear to fallunder the guise of informal rulemaking or adjudication to
find out whether Chevron applies.
136. Id. at 865; See generally, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-767 1.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843.
137.
138. Id. at 842.
139. Id. at 843.
140. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n. 11.
Id. at 865.
141.
142. Id.
143
Id.
144.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-4.
145.
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
146.
PLATER supra note 1. at Statutory Capsule Appendix, 51 ("The APA is the basic format
statute for federal agencies' procedures for making law that affects persons outside the agencies
(Title 5), and judicial review thereof (Title 7).").
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must inquire as to whether an agency acted within the scope of its
authority, 47 complied with proscribed procedures, 148 or acted arbitrarily
and capriciously and thus, abused its discretion. 49 Title 7 of the Act
"creates a 'generous review provision' that should be given 'a hospitable
150
reception' in the reviewing courts."'
C. Pre-survey PeriodTenth CircuitDiscretion Cases
Tenth Circuit environmental cases often hinge on agency
discretion.' 51 Most often, the court has found that agencies have acted
within their discretion.' 52 In Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 53 a company
that operated a forest service concession facility and a county that collected sales taxes from it wanted the court to review the Forest Service's
decision not to rebuild the facility after it burned down. 154 The court held
that the Forest Service's decision was not arbitrary or capricious. 155 In
another case, non rofit and livestock organizations in Public Lands
Council v. Babbitt 56 challenged Department of Interior regulations regarding public-land livestock grazing. 157 The Court of Appeals held that
the Secretary of Interior did not exceed his authority in approving three
regulations, but one regulation which allowed permits for the use of public lands for58conservation instead of livestock grazing was not authorized
by statute. 1
Similarly, in Delgado v. Department of Interior, 59 the agency had
discretion (and the court commented on one approach to Chevron analysis). Delgado sued the department over a land-use lease and argued that
the agency was required to cancel it when a violation of any of the relevant lease regulations occurred. 160 Delgado outlined the language of the
guiding regulation: "A lease will be canceled by the Secretary ... if at any
time the Secretary is satisfied that the provisions of the lease or of any

147.. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also, Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
148. Id.
149. Id.; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs Assoc. v. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983) (limits a court's
review under APA's "arbitrary and capricious" test).
150. PLATER supra note 1, at Statutory Capsule Appendix. 51 (citing Abbott Lab v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967)).
151.
See the Tenth Circuit standing cases review, supra. Many of the plaintiffs sought review
of agency discretion.
152. As the following cases express.
153.
Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994).
154. Id. at 1447.
155.
Id. at 1455.
156. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
157.
Id. at 1289.
158. Id. at 1309.
159. Delgado v. Dept. of Interior, 153 F.3d 726 (Table) (10th Cir. 1998) (All page numbers are
expressed as single numerals because this is a table case.).
160.

Id. at 3-4.
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regulations . . . have been violated," and argued that Chevron analysis
should be the basis for the review. 6 1 The court held Chevron inapplicable, writing that it only applies when regulations are challenged because
they are allegedly inconsistent with a ruling statute.' 62 "When interpreting its own regulation," the court wrote, "an agency is entitled to exercise
even broader discretion than it may under the second prong of
Chevron."'163 Delgado also claimed that the agency decision was arbitrary
and capricious.164 "Our review under this standard is narrow, and we may65
not substitute our judgment for that of the agency," the court wrote.
66
The court concluded that the agency did not abuse its discretion.
In Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Babbitt,167 the court again deferred to the agency. 68 There, an environmental group sued the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service to enforce an Endangered Species Act (ESA) deadline to list an endangered grouse. 169 The Colorado district court granted
summary judgment for defendants and the plaintiff appealed. 70 The
Court of Appeals decided that the agency's use of listing priority guidance did not violate the Act's requirement that
7' a 90-day deadline be
achieved "to the maximum extent practicable.,
The court wrote, "At the outset, we note 'Congress delegated broad
administrative and interpretive powers to the Secretary' when it enacted
the ESA. 17 Although the Service 'must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress,' courts must defer to the Service's interpretation of the ESA if Congressional intent is ambiguous or nonexistent
and the Service's construction of the statute is a permissible one. 173 A
challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision must fail if,
ambiguity or silence, the agency's action 'is a reain light of Congress's
174
sonable choice.""

161.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
162.
Id. (citing Valley Camp, 24 F.3d at 1267).
163.
Delgado. 153 F.3d at 726, 6.
164.
Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
165.
(1983); Also, "[T]he agency need only demonstrate that it considered relevant factors and
alternatives after a full ventilation of issues and that the choice it made was reasonable based on that
consideration." (citing Lodge Tower Condo. Ass'n v. Lodge Properties, Inc., 85 F.3d 476, 477 (10th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1453 (10th Cir. 1994)).
Delgado, 153 F.3d at 726, 7.
166.
Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
167.
168. Id. at 1257.
169. Id. at 1250.
170. Id. at 1252.
Id.
171.
172.
Biodiversity, 146 F.3d. at 1253 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995)).
173. Biodiversity. 146 F.3d at 1253 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
174. Biodiversitv. 146 F.3d at 1253 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866).
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In Maier v. U.S. E.P.A., 75 environmental groups challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision not to include nitrogenous biochemical oxygen demand (NOD) controls for publicly-owned
treatment works wastewater in its definition of "secondary treatment" in
Clean Water Act regulations. 76 The Court of Appeals found in part that
EPA's decision to refuse to include the NOD controls and instead limit
NOD with yermits was within the agency's discretion under the Clean
Water Act.
Furthermore, in Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A.,178 environmental groups
sought judicial review of the EPA's decision "to exempt counties from
selected Clean Air Act (CAA) ozone nonattainment area requirements
without first formally redesignating counties as attainment areas."' 79 The
Court of Appeals held in part that EPA's interpretation of the CAA provisions in such a way was within its discretion and not contrary to the
Act. 180
The Tenth Circuit does not always rule for the agency.' 81 In Mt. Emmons Min. Co. v. Babbitt,'82 a mining company sued the Department of
Interior to make the agency continue processing the company's mining
patents application. 83 The Colorado district court granted summary
judgment for the agency and the plaintiff appealed. 84 The Court of Appeals held that the agency's discontinuance of
' 85application processing was
an "unlawful withholding of agency action."'
As the cases below further exemplify, arbitrary decision making, decisions without statutory authority, and agency discretion are factors that
often govern the court's assessment of other controversial environmental
issues.
D. Discretion Casesfrom Other Circuits
Other circuits have dealt with similar environmental cases in which
186
SW Ctr.
example,
was thev. lynch-pin
discretion
agency
that in
a goshawk
alleged
plaintiffsFor
Babbitt,'8 7issue.
Diversity
For Biological

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Maier v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 114 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 1045.
Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 99 F.3d 1551 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1553.
Id. at 1558.
As described in the next example.
Mt. Evans Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 1168.
Id.
As the following cases indicate.
SW Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Babbit, 215 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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should be listed under the Endangered Species Act. The district court
remanded instructions to the Fish and Wildlife Service to census the
hawks.' 88 The D.C. Circuit held that Endangered Species Act requirements mandating the service to use "best results" in its decision making
does not require it to do surveys, but rather gives the agency discretion to
decide what is best. 89 Similarly, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal,190
plaintiffs tried to enjoin the construction of a new school on potential
habitat of an endangered owl. 19 1 The appeals court held that evidence,
analyzed by the agency, showed
construction would not take the owl,
92
and deferred to that decision.1
In Shenandoah Ecosystem Def. Group v. U.S.F.S.,' 93 plaintiffs
wanted to stop proposed logging because an endangered salamander
lived on national forest land targeted for timber cutting. 94 The court of
appeals held that there was no evidence
that the agency's use of discre95
tion was arbitrary or capricious.1
In Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,19 6 environmental groups sued the Corps under the Clean Water Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), challenging a decision to
give a developer a permit to fill wetlands and mitigate the fill by creating
an artificial wetland system. 197 The Central California district court
granted summary judgment to the groups on their NEPA claims, disallowed the permit, and enjoined the developer from further
construction.'" On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Corps' finding
of no significant impact (FONSI) was within its discretion, and not arbitrary and capricious. 199 Similarly, in Central and SouthWest Services,
Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., '00 environmental and industry groups requested review of the Environmental Protection Agency's final rule regulating
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). 20 1 The Fifth Circuit held that the rule
was not arbitrary and capricious. 202

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
2000).
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 59-61.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 922.
Id.
Shenandoah Ecosystem Def. Group v. U.S.F.S., 194 F.3d 1305 (Table) (4th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.
Id.
Id.
at 1110.
Id. at 1122.
Central and SouthWest Services, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 220 F.3d 683 (5th Cir., 2000).
Id.
Id.
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Moreover, in Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Com'n,2 3 a radioactive waste disposal facility requested review of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission refusal to grant the plaintiff a hearing and
intervention in proceedings to license a third party. 204 The D.C. Court of
Appeals held that the agency's interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act
to prevent intervention was reasonable. °5 In Defenders of Wildlife v.
Browner, ° 6 environmental groups requested review of an EPA decision
to issue National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permits to
municipalities without numeric limits to satisfy state water-quality standards. The Ninth Cicruit held in part that the EPA had discretion to
require that such municipalities comply with state standards. 208
In contrast, in Sokol v. Kennedy, 2°9 adjacent landowner plaintiffs
challenged boundaries set by the National Park Service when it designated a scenic river. 2'0 The Eighth Circuit held that the agency failed to
follow the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and that the agency's decision
was not within its discretion. 211
E. Tenth Circuit
212
1. Wyoming Farm Bureau Federationv. Babbitt

In Wyoming Farm Bureau Federationv. Babbitt,21 3 plaintiff ranchers
and environmentalists challenged a Department of Interior decision to
engineer final rules and a plan that would control the reintroduction of an
experimental population of gray wolves into Yellowstone National Park
and central Idaho pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA).214 The
plaintiffs argued that the agency abused its discretion in making the rules
because the Department did not follow statutory requirements of the
ESA.21 5 Throughout its opinion, the Tenth Circuit consistently deferred
to the agency's interpretation of the ESA and supported the agency's
decisions notwithstanding their controversial nature.21 6 The court used

203.

Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Com'n, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

204.
205.

Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 78.

206.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999).

207.
208.

Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1166-67.

209.

Sokol v. Kennedy, 210 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2000).

210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 877.
Id.
Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000).
Id.

214.
215.
216.

Id.; Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1529.
Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 199 F.3d. at 1224.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d, at 1228, 1239.
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the classic Chevron and APA tests to pin down the agency's decisions,
analyze them, and affirm them.21 7
The plaintiffs argued that if reintroduced wolves were allowed to
combine with wild ones, ranchers (and others) would not be able to
identify which wolves have full protected status and which do not under
the ESA. 218 Therefore, under the reintroduction rules which would allow
such mingling, 219 some wolves could be shot and killed if the animals
become a nuisance. Yet, ranchers would not know which ones have protected status, so risk prosecution for shooting the wrong wolf.220 Also,
some environmentalists 22
argued that all wolves, reintroduced or not,
should be fully protected. 1
The Department of Interior established rules for the reintroduction
based primarily on ESA Section 10j. 222 Even though a naturally occurring colony of Montana wolves exists that could infiltrate the experimental population,223 the plan allowed the "taking" (killing) of any
wolves if found in the act of killing or wounding livestock, even though
on at least a superficial level this seemed to go against the usual ESA
restrictions on takings. 224
The main question before the court was whether the Department of
Interior abused its discretion by allowin5 the experimental population to
incorporate naturally occurring wolves. The plaintiffs argued that the
ESA requires experimental populations to be wholly separate from natural ones, and that naturally occurring wolves as a result of the rules do
not have full protection under the ESA.226 The plaintiffs also argued that
the Department Interior abused its discretion by going against ESA Section 10(j). 227 They argued that since individual, native wolves could enter
the experimental population areas, this was an overlap of experimental
and current-range wolf populations, prohibited by 10(j)'s requirement
that experimental populations be completely separate geographically
from nonexperimental populations.228

217.
Id. at 1230-1231.
218. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F.Supp. 1349, 1361 (1999).
219. See discussion, supra p. 25 - 2 7 .
220. Id.
221.
See generally, Babbitt, 987 F.Supp. 1348 (1999).
222. ESA Section 10(j), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j).
223. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1229.
224.
Id.; see generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (one typically cannot kill an endangered
species).
225.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d, 1224, 1230 ("The crux of this case, and hence this opinion, is the
validity of the final rules governing the introduction of a nonessential experimental population of
gray wolves in the entirety of Yellowstone and in central Idaho.").
226. Id. at 1232.
227.
Id.; see discussion of section 10(j), pages 26-7.
228. Id.
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The Administrative Procedure Act and Chevron229 governed the
court's review of whether the agency stayed within the bounds of its discretion dictated by Congress in the ESA.230 The court held that it "will
set aside the Agencies' factual determinations only if they are unsupported by substantial evidence" that the agency did not meet the Act's
231
requirements.
Applying Chevron, the court stated it would give "strict effect to the
unambiguous intent of Congress if Congress has clearly spoken to the
issue before us. '232 However, the court determined that if Congress was
"silent on the issue and has delegated authority over the subject matter to
the Agencies, [we will defer] to the Agency's construction unless, in the
context of the
Act, the Department's construction is unreasonable or im' 233
permissible.
The court went on to consider the language of the statute in light of
the policy and object of the law. 234 It found that Congress enacted the law
generally to "provide for the conservation, protection, restoration, and
,,235
propagation of species of fish, wildlife, and plants facing extinction.
The court then set forth the relevant portions of the ESA, sections
4(f), 7(a)(1) and 100). 23 6 The court wrote that section 4(f) directs the
Secretary of Interior "to develop and implement recovery plans for the
'conservation and survival' of listed species 'unless he finds that such a
plan will not promote the conservation of the species.' ' 237 In addition,
the court wrote, section 7(a)(1) authorizes the Secretary to 'live' trap and
'transplant' (reintroduce) rare species, if necessary, to bring an endangered or threatened species to the point at which the protective measures
of the ESA are no longer necessary. 2 38

229. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
230.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1231 ("Our review of the rules and record is governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Essentially, we must determine whether the
Agencies: (1) acted within the scope of their authority, (2) complied with prescribed procedures, and
(3) took action that was neither arbitrary and capricious, nor an abuse of discretion. (citing
Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1574.) Within this context, we will set aside the Agencies' factual
determinations only if they are unsupported by substantial evidence. 'The substantial-evidence
standard does not allow a court to displace the [Agencies'] choice between two fairly conflicting
views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it de novo.' (citing Trimmer v. United States Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 1098, 1102 (10th
Cir.1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted))".
231.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1231.
232. Id.
233.
Id. (citing Hoyl v. Babbitt, 129 F.3d 1377, 1387 (10th Cir.1997) (citing Chevron, 467
U.S. 837 (1984)).
234.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1231-32.

235.

Id.

236.
237.

Id.; 16 U.S.C. §§1533(f), 1536(a)(1), and 1539(j), respectively.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1231 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §1533(f)).

238.

Id
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213

The court then d~fined the Congressional intent of the ESA. 239 It
concluded that Congress enacted section 10(j) to counter agency frustration over political opposition to reintroductions that were thought to conflict with human activity. 24 0 The court wrote that Section 10(j) gives the
Secretary of Interior authority to release any population of endangered
species outside its current range as long as "the Secretary determines that
such release will further the conservation of such species. 2 4' Yet, the
court found that an experimental population must be "separate geo242
graphically from non-experimental populations of the same species.,
Also, the court held, the agency must determine "whether or not such
population is essential to the continued existence" of an endangered or
threatened species. 243
The court further detailed the Congressional intent behind section
100):
Congress hoped the provisions of section 10) would mitigate industry's fears that experimental populations would halt development
projects, and with the clarification of the legal responsibilities incumbent with the experimental populations, actually encourage private
parties to host such populations on their lands. 244 Congress purposely
designed section 10() to provide the Secretary flexibility and discretion in managing the reintroduction of endangered species. By regulation, the Secretary can identify experimental populations, determine
whether such populations are essential or nonessential, and, consistent with that determination, provide control mechanisms (i.e., controlled takings) where the Act would not otherwise permit the exercise of such control measures against listed species.
The court did not agree with the plaintiffs that the agency abused its
discretion in designing a reintroduction plan in which native and reintroduced wolves may co-mingle. 246 The court stressed that the ESA does not
define the phrase "wholly separate geographically from nonexperimental
populations," so does not provide an answer to "whether a reintroduced
population of animals must be separate from every naturally occurring
individual animal. ' 247

239.

Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1232.

240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
16 USC §1539(j)(2)(A).
16 USC §1539(j)(2).
16 USC §1539(j)(2)(B).

244.

Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1232 (citing H.R.Rep. No 97-567, at 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982

USCCAN 2807, 2808, 2817; see also 16 USC Section 15396)).
245.
246.
247.

Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1233.
Id.
Id. at 1234.
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Due to the fact that the statute was unclear the court deferred to the
Department of Interior's interpretation. 248 The court held that the agency
defines "population" as "a group of fish or wildlife ... in common spatial arrangement that interbreeds when mature., 249 Furthermore, the court
held, "a 'geographic separation' is any area outside the area in which a
particular population sustains itself., 250 Therefore, the court found that
there was no conflict between the agency's interpretation and Congress'
intent of section 100), because "the paramount objective of the Endangered Species Act [is] to conserve species, not just individual
animals.",251 The court bolstered its reasoning by noting that some endangered species lose protected status when they move across state or international borders.2252
Next, the court held that the Department of Interior does not have to
give full ESA protection to any naturally occurring wolf found within the
experimental areas. 253 It wrote that the district court's finding that the
final reintroduction rules constituted a "de facto delisting" of naturally
occurring lone wolves 254 and denied ESA protection to such wolves and
their offspring was erroneous.25 5 The Tenth Circuit held that the district
court erroneously limited the administrative discretion that Congress put
in section 100), "ignore[d] biological reality," and issued an opinion that
did not fit with the larger purpose of the ESA. 256
In upholding the Department of Interior's interpretation of the ESA,
the Tenth Circuit defined the contours of the Department's discretion
regarding its reintroduction plan. 25 It wrote that the Secretary of Interior
could define an experimental population to include "imported wolves"
and "lone dispersers," because the agency decided this was the best way
to recover the species, and nothing in the ESA prevented it. 258 In particular, the court wrote that Section 10(j)'s language requiring geographical separation between experimental, released populations and
native ones allows for agency discretion.25 9 Furthermore, such language,
the court wrote, does not restrict the agency's discretion to define a
248.
249.

250.
1373).

Id.
50 CFR Section 17.3.

Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1234 (citing Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F.Supp. at

251.

Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1235.

252.
253.

Id.
Id.

254.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1236 (citing the district court); "De facto delisting" means the wolf
effectively would be taken off the endangered list and lack protection of the Endangered Species
Act.
255.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1236.

256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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population that may include wolves from other geographically separate
populations. 26 0 "Such a narrow interpretation is not supported by the provision 26or the Endangered Species Act read as a whole," the court
wrote. '
Moreover, the court stated that Congressional intent gave the
agency wide flexibility.2 62 Congress gave the agency authority to define
an experimental population "'on the basis of location, migration pattern,
or any other criteria that would provide notices as to which populations.
. . are experimental. ' ' ' 63 So, the court said, Section 10(j) really protects
the agency's authority "to designate when and where an experimental
population may be established," instead of limiting the agency's flexibility.26

In further support of its decision to allow agency discretion, the
court declared that the restrictive interpretation of the ESA sought by the
plaintiffs could undermine the Department of Interior's ability to deal
with biological reality. 265 That in turn, the court wrote, could undermine
species recovery.26 6 Moreover, the court held that a subspecies of the
wolf that the plaintiffs claimed exists does not, based on the Department's research.267 The court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, 268 and deferred to the agency's discretion. 269 Finally, the
Id.
261.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1237.
262. Id.
263.
Id. (citing H.r. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, 97th Congl, 2d Sess. at 34 (1982)).
264.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1237 ("While the protection of individual animals is one obvious
means of achieving that goal, it is not the only means. It is not difficult to imagine that sound
population management practices tailored to the biological circumstances of a particular species
could facilitate a more effective and efficient species-wide recovery, even if the process renders
some individual animals more vulnerable. However, neither Congress nor this court are equipped to
make that type of species management decision. Recognizing that fact, Congress left such decisions
to the Department. We conclude the Department reasonably exercised its management authority
under section 10(j) in defining the experimental wolf population by location.").
265.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1236-37 (citing 59 Fed.Reg. at 60256. 60261) ("(1) There were no
reproducing wolf pairs and no pack activity within the designated experimental areas. (2) wolves can
and do roam for hundreds of miles, and (3) it would be virtually impossible to preclude naturally
occurring individual gray wolves from intermingling with the experimental population.... The
Secretary intentionally identified the experimental population as all wolves found within the
experimental areas, including imported wolves and any lone dispersers and their offspring. The
Department determined it could best manage the wolf reintroduction program to achieve species
recovery in this manner. We find nothing in the Act that invalidates this approach by requiring the
protection of individuals to the exclusion or detriment of overall species recovery, or otherwise
limiting the Department's flexibility and discretion to define and manage an experimental population
pursuant to section 10(j).").
266. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1236.
267. Id. at 1239.
268. See discussion, supra. of Administrative Procedure Act.
269. Id. (citing Trimmer, 174 F.3d at 1102; National Cattlemen's Ass'n v. EPA, 773 F.2d 268,
271 (10th Cir.1985) ("Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, we cannot displace
the Defendants' choice between two fairly conflicting views, and must defer to the agencies' view on
260.
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court held that as long as the agency "took a 'hard look"' at the environmental consequences of the wolf reintroduction, it would not secondguess the agency's environmental impact statement under NEPA. 270
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit in classic deference mode held that
the Department of Interior had discretion to create its controversial wolf
reintroduction plan despite its controversial nature because there was no
Congressional intent otherwise.2 7'
2. Analysis
Administrative agencies have the requisite resources, grounded in
the specialized expertise of their employees, to make final decisions regarding day-to-day issues.:- The Department of Interior and its subordinate agencies like the Fish and Wildlife Service are certainly
examples. 273 In contrast, few, if any, Congresspersons have the knowledge, skill or experience to understand the technical, biological and ecological framework of decisions as critical as whether and how to reintroduce wolves into the northern Rockies. 274 Furthermore, political motivations that might underlie such decision making 275 likely would be a force
preventing those in Congress from making unbiased, scientifically objective judgments without regard to influences such as economics, 2which
76
are not supposed to be taken into account under ESA Section 10(j).
The ESA, like many statutes passed by Congress, gives agencies direction and only provides a framework for guidance. 27 7 Agencies are left
to put the substantive meat on the bones of the statute. When a decision to list an endangered species under the statute is made, a public

scientific matters within their realm of expertise. Because this is a scientific matter within the
Agencies' expertise, and because there is ample evidence in the administrative record to support the
Defendants' position, we uphold their subspecies conclusions.").
270. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1240.
271.
Id.
272. See PLATER supra note 1,at 378. ("Agencies are just that: agents. Their only reason for
existence, since they are not provided for in the federal Constitution or most state constitutions, is
that the constitutionally created branches of government had too much detailed work to do than they
could conveniently do themselves. [They] accordingly delegated some of their powers to standing
agents in order to spread the workload and drudgery of performing investigations, day-to-day
oversight, and hands-on administrative tasks of running a society.").
273. As agencies of the executive branch.
274. Because few lawmakers are trained experts in those fields.
275.
For example, Western, states-rights, frontier-minded Congresspersons interested in
protecting ranchers in their states might favor a policy that would limit Endangered Species Act
protections for the wolves, while more liberal environmentally minded Congresspersons might
prefer stronger restrictions.
276. See ESA, Section 10(j), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j).
277. See generally the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-44.
278. Id.
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comment period is required before the final listing.279 Yet, if concerned
groups like the plaintiffs in Babbitt cannot change an agency's mind
through commentary and persuasion, they must file suit.
Babbitt arguably is legally and socially important.28 ° One commentator provided a context for its importance. 281 Scott Youngblood wrote,
"the district court's [ruling] basically states that if naturally occurring...
wolves are mixed with reintroduced ...wolves, which are called experimental-nonessential wolves, the reintroduced or experimental-nonessential wolves must be removed. 2 82 He continued: "Ranchers
who are allowed to kill nonessential wolves under certain
circumstances 283 will not be able to tell the difference between endangered and nonessential wolves. Thus, ranchers will not be able to determine whether they are allowed to kill a particular wolf. Such a ruling by
a federal district court is contrary to the Congressional intent set forth in
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)." 284 Youngblood went on to
say that, "a dispute over an erroneous interpretation of a statutory definition is not a basis for condemning an animal to death., 285 Even some of
those generally opposed to wolf reintroduction agree that the Department
of Interior plan might work.286 Youngblood quotes Senator James
McClure of Idaho, who opposed reintroductions but recognized "'that a
narrowly restrictive reintroduction would be less bad for the livestock
industry than an unrestricted wave of natural immigration. ' '' 287 Youngblood also quotes biologists and wolf experts who agree flexible management plans are needed for reintroduction. 288
If management plans (or other kinds of plans) require flexibility,
and agencies are given court-backed discretion to use or create that flexibility, what can opponents of the plan do if they disagree with a decision
made pursuant to this discretion? Opponents of any agency decisionregarding management plans or other issues--confront the same
279.
280.

See ESA, Section 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(B-E).
See National Public Radio, Wolves in Yellowstone, http://search.npr.org/cf

/cmn/cmnps05fm.cfm?SeglD=69171; see also, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC

PARK PROFILES: YELLOWSTONE COUNTRY, 12, 44, 98-99, 182 (1997); for possible reintroductions
in Colorado, see Theo Stein, Wolf reintroductionroams closer to Colorado, Denver Post, February
17, 2001, at Al.
281.
Scott Youngblood, Wildlife Restoration Projects: Hope for Life or a Death Sentence? A
Look at the Reintroduction of Wolves to the Northern Rocky Mountains. 40 S.TEX. L. REV. 1045.
282. Id. at 1047.
283. Id. at 1047, 1047 n. 13 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(i)(3) (1998) ("Authorizing the killing of
wolves under various circumstances such as seeing a wolf attacking livestock on private land, or if
carrying a permit, when seeing a wolf attacking livestock on public lands if there are six or more
breeding pairs of wolves in the area.").
284.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
285. Youngblood supra note 281, at 1047.
286. Id. at 1062.
287.
Id. at 1066 (quoting Thomas McNamee, The Return of the Wolf to Yellowstone 31, 33
(1997)).
288. Youngblood supra note 1, at 1066.
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garding management plans or other issues-confront the same question.
They might be better prepared to challenge agencies if they conduct
some straightforward research and test the agency decision themselves
before setting foot into a courtroom.
First, potential plaintiffs should apply the APA's "arbitrary and catest, 289 and the Chevron test 29 ° to the opposed agency

pricious"
29

decision. 1 Well-prepared plaintiffs should try to predict the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the challenged decision, using the court's interpretations of prior, similar decisions under the tests. In analyzing the
decisions under the tests, potential plaintiffs should read the entire statute
in question with particular focus on the Congressional intent that supposedly gives the agency authority and discretion.
As the court did in Wyoming Farm Bureau,22992 plaintiffs could find
the appropriate House or Senate reports and dissect them carefully to
assess the actual intent of Congress. For example, the intent of the ESA
arguably is to promote the reintroduction of endangered species so that
the ESA does not have to be used anymore. 293 In other words, protecting
endangered species today allows populations of those species to grow so
that they are no longer endangered.
In that light, when the Wyoming Farm Bureau court held that Section 10(j)'s 'wholly separate geographically' 294 language did not force
the agency to define a population that may not include wolves from other
geographically separate populations, the court was doing what Chevron
requires. 295 Even though 10(j) clearly states a preference for "wholly
separate" populations, the court, looking at the entirety of the statute,
allowed the Department of Interior's interpretation to gloss the statutory
language.296 The judges concluded that biological reality (the fact that
native wolves and experimental ones might mix, thereby making all of
them subject to takings by ranchers, etc.) was the best guiding principle.
The Deptartment of Interior should, therefore, be able to release wolves
in a way would advance the ESA's fundamental purpose of helping more
individuals (not just single ones who risk being shot by ranchers), therefore the species itself, to survive. At the end of the day, the court empha-

289. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
290. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-844.
291.
Moreover, before going to court, plaintiffs should explore every option available to
influence the agency's decision, including use of the popular media to draw support for their cause,
and emphatic lobbying of the agency.
292. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (2000).
293. Id. (As the Babbitt court stated in its analysis.).
294. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1232.
295.
Chevron analysis allows such permissible construction of the statute. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842-43.
296. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. at 1371.
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sized the importance of fundamental propositions about species recovery
that underlie the ESA over the specific statutory language.
Further inquiry into the Tenth Circuit's holdings could lead some
potential plaintiffs to conclude that the Tenth Circuit often emphasizes
agency discretion found in Congressional intent, even when that intent is
not totally clear. For example, if plaintiffs were interested in a grazing
permits issue, they could evaluate the Tenth Circuit's preference for deference to agency decisions, highlighted by a case like Public Lands v.
Babbitt.297 Alisha Molyneux, who commented on the court's grazing
permits trend, wrote, "The court recognized that the judiciary should
defer to an agency's decisions concerning how the agency interprets
statutory commands. A court is not to substitute its judgment for the
policies and decisions effected by an agency. Because the TGA [grazing
act] authorizes the Secretary's discretion in issuing grazing permits, the
Secretary's authority in making such decisions has been greatl increased
by the Tenth Circuit's reading of both Chevron and the TGA.
In conclusion, when confronting a potential court decision that
might favor agency discretion, plaintiffs can take prophylactic measures
to assure that they use the same guidelines the court does to assess
whether agency thinking should prevail. By staying a step ahead of the
court, plaintiffs might well avoid a courtroom loss that could have been
foreseen.
299
3. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney

In Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney,300 four-wheel-drive
proponents who wanted continued access to a back country road challenged portions of the National Park Service's Backcountry Management
Plan (BMP) for Canyonlands National Park in Southeastern Utah. 301 The

297. 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
298. Alisha Molyneux, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt: Tenth Circuit Decides that the Taylor
Grazing Act "Breathes Discretionat Every Pore" 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 132.
299. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819 (10th Cir. 2000).
300. Id.
301.
Id. at 823; The relevant portion of the BMP (Canyonlands National Park and Orange
Cliffs Unit of Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, Backcountry Management Plan, at 13
(January 6, 1995)): "Salt Creek and Horse Canyon four-wheel drive roads in the Needles District
will remain open to vehicular traffic, but travel will be by backcountry use permit only. A locked
gate at the north end of the road (the location of the current gate) will control access. Day use
permits for Salt Creek and Horse Canyon will be limited to ten (10) permits for private motor
vehicles (one vehicle per permit), two (2) permits for commercial motor vehicle tours (one vehicle
per permit), one (1) or more permits for up to seven (7) private or commercial bicyclists, one (1)or
more permits for up to seven (7) pack or saddle stock ....All permits are available through the
advance reservation system. Unreserved permits or cancellations will be available to walk-in
visitors."; For a good overview of increased off-road vehicle use on public lands in the West, see
Penelope Purdy, Our scarred land: monitoring ORVs not an easy job, Denver Post, February 11,
2001 at GI.
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plan closed a one-half mile segment of the Salt Creek Road to fourwheel-drive traffic.3 °2

The National Park Service (NPS) claimed the BMP's goal was to
balance recreation and protection of park resources as a response to in303
creased visitation and the resulting impacts on resources in the park.
Before the district court trial, the NPS interpreted its controlling statutory
mandate 304 that the agency must prevent "significant, permanent impairment" of resoifrces. 3°5 During litigation, though, the agency advanced
draft policies that stated an even more restrictive interpretation of the
National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 (Organic Act), 3°6 legislation
that describes the focus, priorities and goals of the agency.30 7 Management of Can onlands National Park is controlled in part by its enabling
legislation.
The district court found that the Organic Act and Canyonlands enabling legislation did not allow the NPS to authorize activities that "permanently impair park resources," and that such impairment would occur
if motorized vehicle use were allowed on the road. 9 The court then en310
joined the NPS from allowing such use. Interestingly, the NPS did not
3
1
Instead, intervenor Utah Shared Access appealed, arguing that
appeal. 3 12
the BMP did not violate the NPS's Organic Act, 313 and that the district

302. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 823.
303.
Id. at 822.
304. The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1.
Dabney, 222 F.3d at 825.
305.
306. id. at 827.
307.
Id. at 824.; see U.S.C. § 1 ("The service thus established shall promote and regulate the
use of the Federal areas known as national parks... by such means and measures as conform to the
fundamental purpose of the said parks ...which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural
and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.");
see also, 16 U.S.C. § la-I ("The authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection,
management, and administration of these areas shall be conducted in light of the high public value
and integrity of the National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and
purposes for which these various areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be
directly and specifically provided by Congress.").
308.
Dabney, 222 F.3d at 823; see 16 U.S.C. § 271 ("In order to preserve an area in the State
of Utah possessing superlative scenic, scientific, and archeologic features for the inspiration, benefit,
and use of the public, there is hereby established the Canyonlands National Park ....; see also 16
U.S.C. § 271(d)(Canyonlands must be managed in accordance with the purposes of the Organic
Act.).
309.
Dabney, 222 F.3d at 822 (citing Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 7
F.Supp.2d 1205 (D.Utah 1998).
310. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 822.
311.
Id.
Dabney at 823; see Canyonlands National Park and Orange Cliffs Unit of Glen Canyon
312.
National Recreation Area, Backcountry Management Plan, at 13 (January 6, 1995) ("Salt Creek and
Horse Canyon four-wheel drive roads in the Needles District will remain open to vehicular traffic,
but travel will be by backcountry use permit only. A locked gate at the north end of the road (the
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34
court abused its discretion by enjoining the BMP's implementation.
The agency nonetheless submitted a brief to the appeals court "to advise
the court as to the Department's
view as to the proper legal construction
3 15
Act."
[Organic]
the
of

Two questions arose on appeal.3 16 One was whether the district
court's finding that the BMP violated the Organic Act was correct under
Chevron.317 The other was whether the NPS's draft backcountry policies
(those regarding whether to allow off-road vehicle use) submitted to the
court were sufficiently formal to require Chevron deference to the
agency's conclusions. 3 18 First, the court looked to the Administrative
Procedure Act for guidance, and wrote: 3 19 "Informal agency action must
be set aside if it fails to meet statutory, procedural or constitutional requirements or if it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. 32 °
Next, the Tenth Circuit utilized the two-part conjunctive Chevron
test to analyze the NPS's interpretation of the Organic Act and Canyonlands enabling legislation. 32 The court outlined the two steps in Chevron, and ruled that the district court erred in resolving the issue under the
first inquiry alone, which requires adherence to the intent of Congress if
that intent is clear.322
The court found the Congressional intent unclear.323 The Tenth Circuit stated that the Organic Act neither defines the word "unimpaired" or
the phrase "unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations" in the
Act. Therefore, because the Congressional intent was unclear, it also
was unclear how the "duration and severity of the impairment are to be

location of the current gate) will control access. Day use permits for Salt Creek and Horse Canyon
will be limited to ten (10) permits for private motor vehicles (one vehicle per permit), two (2)
permits for commercial motor vehicle tours (one vehicle per permit), one (1) or more permits for up
to seven (7) private or commercial bicyclists, one (1) or more permits for up to seven (7) pack or
saddle stock . . . . All permits are available through the advance reservation system. Unreserved
permits or cancellations will be available to walk-in visitors.").
313.
Dabney at 824.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 822.
316. Id. at 825.
317. Id. at 826.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 824 (quoting Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994),
and the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).
321.
Dabney, 222 F.3d at 825 ("On appeal, Utah Shared Access argues that the district court
erred in resolving the issue under the first Chevron inquiry. Utah Shared 'Access argues that the
district court should have reached the second Chevron inquiry because of ambiguities inherent in the
relevant statutes and their application to the issue of vehicular access. We agree.").
322. Dabney at 825-26.
323. Id. at 826.
324. id.; see Organic Act text, note 262.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

evaluated or weighed against the other value of public use of the
park.

325

Instead, the court ruled, the district court should have gone on to the
second inquiry, whether agency interpretation is based on an acceptable
interpretation of the statute in question when the intent of Congress is
missing or unclear. 326 The court applied Chevron's step two, whether the
Department of Interior's answer was based on "permissible construction
of the statute. 327
The court analyzed the agency's brief, its oral argument, and its supplemental Draft Policies, all of which outlined the agency's position on
the Organic Act. 328 The court found that the NPS's philosophical position
in these documents differed from the position the agency adopted before
the district court, so concluded
that "there is currently no valid agency
' 329
position worthy of deference.

The court stated that although an agency can change its position on
the meaning of a statute and still receive Chevron deference, a position
taken while the litigation is ongoing is not worthy of deference. 330 The
court held that the agency's policies were only in draft form and were not
finalized or adopted by the agency, so deserved neither Chevron deference nor any lesser deference.
Next, the court cited provisions of the Organic Act and the Canyonlands enabling legislation in order to compare them to the NPS's interpretation. 332 The Organic Act describes the NPS's purpose: "... to con-

serve the scenery and natural and historic objects and the wild life therein
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. ' ' 333 Further, the Organic Act prohibits "authorization of activities
that derogate park values: 'The authorization of activities ... shall not be
exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which these various areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be
directly and specifically provided by Congress."'

334

The Canyonlands

enabling legislation states that Canyonlands was created done in part to
"preserve an area ... possessing superlative scenic, scientific, and arche-

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Dabney, 222 F.3d at 826.
Id.
Id. at 827 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
Dabney, 222 F.3d at 827-28.
Id. at 828.
Id.
Id.
Dabney, 222 F.3d at 824-26.
Id. at. 825.
Id.
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ologic features for inspiration, benefit and use of the public.... 335 In
contrast, the NPS's BMP, designed with agency discretion, allowed permitted vehicle traffic in the backcountry.3 3 Such traffic arguabley could
limit the public's enjoyment of the area and undermine the Canyonlands'
preservation
The court reversed the district court's finding, and remanded the case
so that the parties' conflicting views regarding the amount of permanent
impairment the BMP would cause could be decided.337 Also, it instructed
3 38
the lower court to review the NPS's finding of 'temporary impairment'
from vehicle use.
The court held that, "on remand, the district court should not limit its
analysis under step two of Chevron to whether the evidence demonstrates
significant, permanent impairment. 339 Rather, it should assess whether
the evidence demonstrates the level of impairment prohibited by the [Organic] Act." 34 Also, if the district court found that the agency has formalized and adopted its view on the Organic Act, the agency's decision
deserved Chevron testing.34'
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the BMP, created by the
agency under its discretion, was not "clearly contrary" to the Organic
Act, but remand was needed to find out if the interpretation was reasonable.342
4. Analysis
In assessing how an agency like the Park Service should interpret its
own guiding Organic Act or other controlling legislation, a plaintiff
should consider general trends in how courts and agencies have interpreted such legislation. University of Denver College of Law Professor
Fred Cheever wrote: "The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916
declares that the purpose of the national parks is to 'conserve' scenery,
'natural and historic objects' and 'wild life' and provide for their enjoyment 'by such means' as to leave them 'unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.' [But,] Congress did not specify by what means the

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id.
Dabney, 222 F.3d at 823, 825.
Id.
Id.
Id.

340.
341.

Id.
Id.

342.

Dabney, 222 F.3d at 829.
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Park Service was to 'conserve' 343
'unimpaired' the national parks while
'enjoyment.'
their
for
providing
Congress' failure to provide further guidance has left the door open
for natural resources and environmental groups, agencies and the courts
to do battle over the true meaning of legislation that controls agency action. Ecologically, economically or politically minded parties transformed into visionary plaintiffs might recognize opportunities to shape
agency policy lurking in the mucky Congress-speak of statutory language.
Congress passes a vaguely worded guiding statutes in reliance on
trust in agencies. Cheever claimed that one reason agency discretion is so
bountiful is that mandates originally granted to agencies like the US Forest Service and the US Park Service were so broad they lacked substance. 344 "Paradoxical mandates were a particularly useful form of legislative carte blanche. They appear to have substance because they speak
of general values in mandatory terms. However, they do not significantly
constrain agency action. Almost anything can be justified between the
two poles of 'use' and 'preservation,' extensive clearcuts and swank hotels as well as limitations on rafting access and livestock trains., 345 "The
resolution of the paradox required balancing, and balancing traditionally
fell within the expert agencies' discretion." 346 Cheever described ways in
which "paradoxical agency mandates. [have been] used to challenge
agency action in court. 3 4 7 He wrote that, "the effect of paradoxical mandates reaches beyond cases in which the language of the statutes are at
issue and color a range of legal disputes about the balance between 4reservation and use," citing the Endangered Species Act as an example.
In particular, Cheever suggested a "gap" between what an agency
3
does and what environmental plaintiffs think the agency should do. 49

343.
Fredrico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and National Park Service:
ParadoxicalMandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74 DENY.

U. L. REV. 625,629.
344. Id. at 638.
345.
Id.; see generally, Robin Winks, The National Park Service Act of 1916: A Contradictory
Mandate? 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 575 (1997).

346.

Cheever supra note 343, at 638.

347.

Id. at 641.

348.

Id. at 642-3. ("Efforts to enforce the act-- mostly in the form of federal court cases

brought by environmental groups--have severely curtailed agency discretion in the Forest Service's
two most valuable timber producing regions: the forests of the southeast-home of the RedCockaded Woodpecker --and the forests of the Northwest, home of the Northern Spotted Owl and
various runs of protected salmon. Forest Service timber production has dropped precipitously in

recent years and not as a result of agency decisions.").
349.
Cheever at 643; See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (Chevron's "gap"; "[If] Congress
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency."); see also William J. Lockhart, New Nonimpairment Policy Projected for the National Park

System, Environmental Law Reporter, September, 2000 ("It is critical for the NPS to recognize that
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Dabney provides a good example. The NPS in their BMP allowed limited back-country vehicle use. The Organic Act and Canyonlands enabling legislation do not mention backcountry vehicle use, but do mention
more general principles like preserving park resources and preventing
their derogation.35 ° Clearly, conceptual or philosophical differences exist
between the NPS's notion of limited vehicular traffic and its association
with resource preservation and preservation and management vision that
absolutely prohibits such traffic for fear of the detrimental effects it
might cause. Any number of arguments could be made as to how motorized vehicles simply do not fit under the generalized principles or ideals
of the guiding statutes.
Nonetheless, Cheever wrote that when groups bring Organic Act
claims against the NPS, the Service usually wins.
As an example, he
cited Wilkins v. Lujan,352 in which a federal district court used Organic
Act language to demonstrate that the NPS had made a "clear error of
judgment" in creating a plan to remove wild horses from the Ozark National Scenic Riverway.
The Eighth Circuit reversed, using Organic
Act language regarding removal of "detrimental" animals to support Park
Service discretion.354 Nonetheless, the lone dissenter said, "I am
hard-pressed to find a clearer example of arbitrary and capricious agency
action. 3 55 "While a victory for the Park Service," Cheever wrote, "the
decision demonstrates the willingness of judges at both the district and

its policies regarding impairments caused by activities approved within the parks will almost
certainly also set the bottom line for all protection that may ultimately be established to address
impairments from external activities. For this reason, there is a great deal for advocates of park
protection to cheer in the proposed draft of the new NPS Management Policies. If applied
straightforwardly with a minimum of politically driven compromises, the policies should generate a
new regime of more reliable protection against impairments generated by developments and uses
within the parks. By the same token, however, if the NPS yields in the adoption or application of
these new policies to the inevitable political demands for a freer 'discretionary' hand to 'balance'
resource protection against the tourism goals of local promoters, damage to the future of our parks
will come not just from the occasional concessions to internal park developments. Policies that
permit continued compromise of the NPS' own protective obligations are also virtually certain to
invite qualifications or limits that will compromise efforts to address external threats. In short, if the
NPS does not set and enforce high standards for control of activities it permits within the parks, it is
difficult to imagine any significant success in controlling the increasing threat from activities outside
the parks. For this among other reasons, it is especially important to ensure that the standard
established for in-park activities is as rigorous as the dictionary definitions of 'impairment'
permit.").
350.
351.
352.
Secretary
353.
354.
355.

See notes supra 307-8, 312.
Id.at643.
Id.,
citing Wilkins v. Lujan, 798 F.Supp. 557 (E.D. Mo. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Wilkins v.
of Interior, 995 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1993).
Cheever supra note 343, at 643.
Id.at 643-4.
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circuit level
to question Park Service decisions about what 'preservation'
356
means."
Cheever highlighted some cases in which the Park Service has won
on its interpretations of its Organic Act, concluding that some of the
opinions "[spoke] directly to the balance between use and preservation
and the discretion of the Park Service to strike that balance. Snowmobilers and hikers, like the environmental groups and local and state governments that batter the Forest Service, have the power to use the Park
Service's ambiguous mandate against it, projecting their values-preservation (in the case of the hikers) or motorized use (in the case of the
snowmobilers)-on Congress' ambiguous language. 357 In conclusion,
Cheever wrote that, "it would be useful to have agency mission statements that were more than mirrors, reflecting back the values of each
interest group on itself. A clearer mission statement, conveying the same
message to all interested parties, would not guarantee enhanced agency
stature and discretion, but would at least make it possible. 358
This could save precious litigation time and costs because everyone
would be clear about what Congress meant for agencies. On the other
hand, clearer mission statements would deny plaintiffs opportunities to
exploit the "gaps" between unclear guiding statutory language and agencies' actual decisions. If the NPS's Organic Act clearly allowed something as controversial as four-wheel-drive activity as in Dabney,359 plaintiffs who opposed the plan would lose because the court would have to
go no further than step one of the Chevron test. 360 Moreover, depending
on the political composition of the Congress in power at the time, a lessconfusing mission statement might be passed, but a "clearer" version of
the NPS's mission statement might vary widely from the arguably proconservation notions upon which the National Park Service was originally founded. If such a statement were so clear as to force absolute adherence by the NPS, natural resources and environmental groups would
be left to wait for a new Congress to change the statute. Again, under
Chevron,361 the agency would be forced to follow the bottom-line intent
of Congress, regardless of whether any particular group of legislators
were able to fashion reasonably preservationist guidance.
The implications of such 'micromanagement' by Congress take on
even more ominous tones. In Dabney, for example, if Congress had decided whether four-wheel-drive use should be allowed in the Canyon356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
line.
361.

Id.
Cheever supra note 343, at 645.
Id. at 646.
As in the previous discussion of Dabney, supra.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; If Congressional intent is clear, that is generally the bottom
As previously discussed.
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lands back country, Congress would be doing the jobs agencies were
created to do. The NPS depends on its rangers, biologists, statisticians,
geologists, engineers and other experts who work on location, collect and
analyze data, and provide the basis for scientifically sound policies that
balance conservation and recreation in highly informed ways. If Congress tried to accomplish such a balancing, the result would likely be
sub-standard in quality because Congress does not have the resources
required to responsibly grapple with such minutia.
A case decided in February, 2001 by the U.S. Supreme Court directly addressed this issue. 36 2 It had the potential to redefine the fundamental constructs of agency discretion. In November, 2000, the Court
heard arguments in Browner v. American Trucking Association,36 3 a case
in which the D.C. Court of Appeals stuck down strict Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) limits on smog and soot, regulated under the
Clean Air Act. 364 The main issue was "whether the EPA's loose construction of the Clean Air Act rendered
the law an unconstitutional dele365
gation of its legislative power."
The EPA must follow and apply the Clean Air Act, 366 which requires the agency to set national air-quality standards "to protect and
enhance the quality of the nation's air resources. ,0367 At the same time,
the act requires the agency to base its decisions on the latest scientific
knowledge about air pollution.36 8 Since the EPA set new, stricter guidelines for limiting smog and soot, it was sued by the trucking industry.369
The D.C. Circuit agreed that the agency did construe the law too loosely,
thereby abusing its discretion.3 7 °
The Court also decided whether the EPA should do a cost-benefit
analysis when deciding air quality standards. 37 1 Responding to a crosspetition filed by the plaintiffs, the Supreme court agreed to consider

362.
Browner v. American Trucking Ass'n (this has since become Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
363. Id.
364.
Steve France, Air of Authority, A.B.A. J., 33, November 2000; See generally, Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-767 1.
365. See France supra note 364, at 33.
366. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (b).
367. id.
368. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671.
369.
See generally, Browner v. American Trucking Ass'n; Steve France, Air of Authority,
ABA Journal, page 33, November 2000; Associated Press, Justices Study Clean-Air Rules Case,
http://www.nytimes.comlaponline/nationallAP-Scotus-Clean-Air.html. ("Some observers believe
that if the Supreme court decided the EPA took too much of Congress' power when it set the cleanair rules, it could affect the regulatory power of other federal agencies with broad Congressional
mandates.").
370. Id.
371.
Id.
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overruling Lead Industries Assoc. v. EPA,372 which held that EPA cannot
do a cost-benefit analysis when setting
clean air standards absent Con37
gressional language telling it to do so.
The Supreme Court did not overturn the case. If it had, it might have
upheld a long-forgotten principle that a D.C. Circuit judge unearthed, the
nondelegation doctrine.?74 It tests agency discretion as whether the
agency has demonstrated an "intelligible principle" required by the
guiding law in making a decision.375 If the Supreme Court had decided to
overturn the case, Congress may have had to give agencies much more
specific instructions, thereby limiting agency discretion. Also, the Court
could have decided to limit agencies' broad discretionary power even
though Congress assigned them376only vague mandates (like 'protect the
public health') through statutes.
Fortunately for those in favor of agency discretion, a unanimous
Supreme Court upheld the EPA's use of discretion to set the stricter pollution guidelines, and decided that the agency does not need to undertake
cost-benefit analysis when creating the guidelines. 377 Redefinition of
agency discretion on a grand scale now must wait for another day in
court or in the Capitol building.
In conclusion, while agencies generally have discretion to make
day-to-day decisions based on their areas of expertise, plaintiffs can exploit differences between the often vague language of Congress expressed in statutes that guide the agencies and the agencies' interpretation of those statutes. By keeping in mind the kinds of tests courts use to
assess whether decisions are allowed under the agency's discretion,
plaintiffs can more effectively hold agencies to statutory standards.

372. Id.; 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
373. Id.
374. See France supra note 364, at 33.
375.
Id.
376. Associated Press, Justices Study Clean-AirRules Case,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Scotus-Clean-Air.html.
("Some observers believe
that if the Supreme Court decided the EPA took too much of Congress' power when it set the cleanair rules, it could affect the regulatory power of other federal agencies with broad Congressional
mandates.").
377.
Theo Stein, Clean Air Challenge Rejected, Denver Post, February 28, 2001, at A 1; Robert
Greenberger, Supreme Court Upholds EPA's Authority to Set Standards Under the Clean Air Act,

Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2001 at A2 ("The court held unanimously that the EPA can't
consider compliance costs when setting clean-air standards. The court also overturned an appeals
court ruling that the EPA usurped Congress' authority in interpreting the 1970 Clean Air Act. The
implications of the decision go far beyond clean-air standards. A ruling for the American Trucking
Associations, Inc. . . . would have cleared the way for other legal challenges that could have
significantly weakened many health and safety rules promulgated by government agencies.").
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CONCLUSION

Environmental and natural resources plaintiffs must be certain that
they meet standing requirements. Standing is an easy step to overlook
when preparing a case that otherwise seems solid. Many requirements,
including injury in fact, zone of interest, and redressability, seem on a
superficial level easy to meet. Many times they are not. The Tenth Circuit has many avenues by which it might find that the wrong plaintiff has
appeared in its hallowed halls. Such a finding results in quick dismissal
of an oft-surprised plaintiff.
Once standing is met, the prospect of a Tenth Circuit decision that
bows to agency discretion looms. There are a number of avenues by
which plaintiffs can prepare for the court's tendency toward such a decision. In effect, plaintiffs should put themselves in the place of the court,
assess through the tests provided by the Administrative Procedure Act
and Chevron how the court might balance factors in the case, then base
their strategies on a prediction of the court's approach.
In approaching any case in which agency discretion is at issue,
plaintiffs should pay special attention to the overall scope and intent of
statutes guiding the agency, especially its controlling legislation. Typically, Congress writes instructions for agencies using a broad pen. Therefore, agencies must make specific, on-the-ground decisions that are
based on the broad principles of the statute, but are often arguably discretionary in detail. Plaintiffs can take advantage of the difference between broad, general Congressional intent and specific agency action,
and argue that the agencies' decisions did not fall fairly within the scope
of the guiding principles. Moreover, plaintiffs should pay special attention to the ways the Tenth Circuit or other courts typically address
standing or discretion issues. Finally, plaintiffs must pay attention to
cases like American Trucking that potentially could undermine agency
discretion. Through deliberate and intensive analysis of these points,
environmental and natural resource plaintiffs might better avoid a court's
acquiescence to agency decisions.
Andrew C. Lillie

